Contemporary liberal concepts of property by Juruś, Dariusz
Dariusz Juruś






English-language scholarly literature uses two terms to describe 
property: property and ownership. These terms are often used 
interchangeably2. They defi ne “rules governing access to and 
control of land and other material resources”3, or the relationship of 
subjects with respect to objects4. John Christman emphasizes that 
this is a complex relation rather than a simple one5. A similar view 
is expressed by Jeremy Waldron, who states that private property 
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1 This article is a modifi ed and shortened version (without the elements of criticism) of the 
seventh chapter of the book: D. Juruś, W poszukiwaniu podstaw libertarianizmu (In search 
of the foundations of libertarianism), Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2012.
2 Cf. J. Christman, The Myth of Property. Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988; idem, Property and Ownership, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/ (access: November 2019).
3 Cf. J. Waldron, The Right to Private..., p. 31.
4 Some scholars argue that since the subject of ownership is not always a material thing, 
but also intangible objects, the subject of the ownership relationship should be r i gh t s,  not 
things. Cf. J. Christman, The Myth..., p. 16.
5 Christman proposes a four-element relationship, which consists of: (1) owners; (2) ways of 




is not a simple relationship between a person and an object, but 
a complex bundle of relationships that differ in nature and effect6. 
In turn, James O. Grunebaum claims that “ownership in general 
is a right constituted relationship, or set of relationships, between 
person in respect to things”7. On the other hand, Stephen R. Munzer 
argues that property may refer to tangible things or may signify 
relations (mainly legal) between people or other entities with respect 
to things8.
When writing of liberal conceptions of ownership, I am referring 
to those notions whose proponents assume that the goal of a person 
is self-development and a respectable life. Subsequently, they 
presuppose that one of the conditions for such development is 
having (not necessarily private) property, which endows individuals 
with both autonomy and a sense of dignity. They also subscribe 
to the view that since not every individual is able to secure this 
property in the form of resources enabling his or her survival 
and development, the state must step in as the ultimate property 
redistributor. According to the theories of these philosophers, it is 
the state that is to decide about the just structure of property and, 
consequently, in conformity with this structure, provide individuals 
with access to property in one form or another. In light of this stance, 
property rights are not absolute but only relative. This means that 
the redistributive and regulatory function of the state is not only 
justifi ed, but also necessary9.
6 J. Waldron, The Right to Private..., p. 28. 
7 J.O. Grunebaum, Private Ownership, London – New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, 
p. 4.
8 S.R. Munzer, A Theory of Property, Cambridge Cambridge University Press,1990, p. 16. 
These relationships can be further specifi ed by referring to the typology proposed by Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, who distinguished four basic relations and elements correlated with them: 
(1) claim rights and duties as correlate concepts; (2) liberty rights and no claim; (3) authority 
rights and ability; (4) immunity and disability. Cf. W.N. Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”, Yale Law Journal 1913, No. 23, pp. 16–59. 
Quoted in: S.R. Munzer, A Theory..., pp. 17–22.
9 John Rawls’s view was not included in the theories presented in the article, because he 
did not devote too much attention to property (the term “property” is not listed in the index of 
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice). Rawls argued that problems related to the system of ownership 
are secondary, ancillary and should be the subject of practice rather than considerations of 
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Ownership as a bundle of rights
The authors of liberal concepts of property view property rights 
not as a unifi ed whole but as a bundle of rights. First and foremost, 
it allows them to “split” property rights into the right to have control 
over the thing owned, the power to transfer and the right to earn 
income10. This “split” of property rights leads to the conclusion that 
these rights should not be treated in the same way. This means, for 
example, that different principles of fair distribution apply in the 
case of the right to control an item, and different ones in the case of 
the right to income obtained from that item.
Such is the position of John Christman, who, in The Myth of 
Property, claims that the liberal concept of so-called private 
ownership must be rejected11. According to this concept, the 
ownership relationship occurs when an individual has the right 
to possess, use, manage, alienate, consume, destroy and gain 
political philosophy. When selecting the authors, I decided to include only those (which, of 
course, does not mean all) who wrote separate monographs on the concept of property. Rawls 
does not meet this condition. Stephen R. Munzer says directly that in Rawls’s A Theory of 
Justice we will not fi nd a precise theory of ownership. Cf. S.R. Munzer, A Theory..., p. 233.
10 These three elements seem crucial to grasping the essence of the liberal view of property. 
The full liberal concept of ownership would consists of the incidents of ownership proposed 
by Antony M. Honoré: (1) the right to own, or the right to possess: to have exclusive physical 
control of a thing; (2) The right to use: to have an exclusive and open-ended capacity to 
personally use the thing; (3) The right to manage: to be able to decide who is allowed to 
use the thing and how they may do so; (4) The right to the income: to the fruits, rents and 
profi ts arising from one’s possession, use and management of the thing; (5) The right to 
the capital: to consume, waste or destroy the thing, or parts of it; (6) The right to security: 
to have immunity from others being able to take ownership of (expropriating) the thing; 
(7) The incident of transmissibility: to transfer the entitlements of ownership to another 
person (that is, to alienate or sell the thing); (8) The incident of absence of term: to be entitled 
to the endurance of the entitlement over time; (9) The prohibition on harmful use: requiring 
that the thing may not be used in ways that cause harm to others; (10) Liability to execution: 
allowing that the ownership of the thing may be dissolved or transferred in case of debt or 
insolvency; and, (11) Residuary character: ensuring that after everyone else’s entitlements 
to the thing fi nish (when a lease runs out, for example), the ownership returns to vest in 
the owner. See: A.M. Honoré, “Ownership”, in: L.C. Becker, Property Rights. Philosophic 
Foundations, London: Routledge 1983, pp. 18–19; J. Waldron, The Right to Private..., p. 49; 
M. Kaczmarczyk, Wstęp do socjologicznej teorii własności (Introduction to sociological theory 
of property), Warszawa: Ofi cyna Naukowa, 2006, pp. 60–61.
11 Christman, rejecting the absolute theory of property, identifi es it with the concept of 
dominium, or unlimited control over things. J. Christman, The Myth..., pp. 5 and 17.
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income from his or her possessions without anyone’s interference, 
especially one whose purpose is to introduce some sort of 
a distribution scheme12. Christman renounces the liberal concept 
of private ownership, which draws on classical liberalism, because 
of its “absolute”13 character, manifesting itself, e.g. in the equal 
treatment of the right to control objects and the right to obtain 
income from them14 (Christman considers the latter right to be the 
key to liberal ownership15). Under this concept, individuals have not 
only the full right to control things in their possession, but also the 
sole right to gain income from these things. However, according to 
Christman, these rights should not only be distinguished from each 
other, but also treated differently. Christman postulates a different 
approach to distribution for these two kinds of ownership16. He 
believes that control of a property expresses the autonomy of the 
individual, while the right to income is only related to the allocation 
of resources, which has no direct bearing on individual autonomy17. 
According to Christman, property rights are not a monolithic block 
of entitlements, but a bundle of two rights: the right to control (use, 
manage, destroy, etc.) and the right to obtain income (from trade, 
rental or production)18.
Whereas in the case control ownership, Christman is in favour 
of maintaining a person’s autonomy, when the right to income is 
concerned, he repudiates the power of individuals to decide on this 
issue. The researcher defi nes the right to income as an increased 
12 Ibidem, p. 31.
13 The absolutism undercurrent of property rights is characteristic not for the classical-
-liberal but the libertarian concept of ownership. See. D. Juruś, “Is Classical Liberalism 
the Source of Libertarianism?”, Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Politicas 2016, 
vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 437–458.
14 J. Christman, The Myth..., p. 7. By alluding to this distinction, Christman evokes the 
concept of the right to income introduced by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, which, according to 
both Proudhon and Christman, violates the principle of egalitarianism.
15 Ibidem, p. 66.
16 Ibidem, p. 8 and 12. The necessity of the split the rights into the right to control and 
the right to income results, in Christman’s opinion, also from the way in which modern 
corporations are run, wherein owners and managers have other types of rights.
17 Ibidem, pp. 7–8.
18 Ibidem, p. 11.
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benefi t fl owing from goods owned by others, artifi cial scarcities 
and economic rent. If the state confi scates such rent, it denies 
the owner of the right to income, without depriving him or her of 
the right to trade. The right to income means the right to obtain 
additional benefi ts from the object, which are not the benefi ts 
derived from the use value of the object19. Christman stresses that 
in imperfect markets with a scarcity of goods, operating costs and 
natural barriers to trade, the prices of some goods may exceed the 
costs incurred by the agent bringing them to the market. In this 
situation, buyers and sellers receive economic rent. Therefore, full 
income rights guarantee the owners benefi ts that go beyond the 
rights to exchange goods20.
James O. Grunebaum, who proposes the concept of autonomous 
ownership, is also a defender of individual autonomy with respect to 
ownership. His theory rests on the moral principle of the autonomy 
of the individual, which says that each person, while respecting the 
autonomy of others, has the right to decide about his or her own 
good and about how to pursue it21. Like Christman, Grunebaum 
proposes to “split” the rights of autonomous ownership into rights 
to ownership of self and labour and rights over land and resources. 
(Grunebaum – unlike Christman – assumes that the individual has 
not only the right to work, but also to gain income derived from 
work).
Self and labour rights are private, while land and resource rights 
are similar to co-ownership. Thus, according to Grunebaum, the 
principle of autonomous ownership excludes both joint ownership 
of a person and his or her work, and private ownership of land 
and resources. Autonomy, writes Grunebaum, requires that every 
19 Ibidem, p. 130.
20 Ibidem.
21 Ibidem, pp. 3–4. Cf. J.O. Grunebaum, Private Ownership..., p. 143. Grunebaum uses the 
term “ownership” instead of the term “property”. He believes that property is associated more 
with something that is found in a thing or object, and not with the relationship between 
persons and relevant things. Instead, the term “ownership” refers to relationships into which 
people enter in connection with certain things. An object itself contains no characteristics 
that would give it the status of someone’s property. Ibidem, pp. 3–4.
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individual should have the right to manage his or her work, as well 
as the right to income from that work and that “each individual 
must have the right to participate in decisions about how land and 
resources are used as, as well as the right to a share of the income 
produced by land and resource utilization”22.
Although, according to Grunebaum’s view, the rights to self, 
labour and income are to be private, and thus guarantee the 
autonomy of the individual, certain restrictions are imposed on 
them. They relate to the obligation to help others who are in need 
“In situation where others ought to be helped, they have a legitimate 
claim to a portion of one’s labor and income?”23. This obligation 
is, in turn, limited by the individual’s own good. This means, as 
Grunebaum himself admits, that the individual does not have an 
absolute right to ownership of his or her labour and its fruits24.
The principle of autonomy implies the right of everyone to co-
-decide on the use of land and its resources25. The cited author does 
not allow the possibility of private possession of land, resources 
or some means of production. In his opinion, private ownership of 
land and its resources is at odds with the principle of autonomy 
with respect to those who do not possess. Grunebaum maintains 
that, in this case, each person’s right to decide about themselves, 
and thus their autonomy, is contravened26.
The inability to decide on the allocation of shared resources leads to 
a violation of the autonomy principle. Each member of a community 
is entitled to co-decide on its resources27. A contravention of the 
principle of autonomy occurs when an individual or group of people 
managing a piece of land (who are not, in light of Grunebaum’s 
view, its owner) does not consult each decision about how to use 
it. “Everyone has a right to be consulted”, writes Grunebaum; as 
22 Ibidem, p. 2.
23 Ibidem, p. 171. 
24 Ibidem, pp. 148–149.
25 Ibidem, p. 170.
26 Ibidem, p. 153.
27 Ibidem, pp. 174–182.
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the principle of autonomous ownership over land and resources 
dictates this28.
Autonomous ownership combines private and joint ownership. 
The individual is, therefore, the private owner of himself or herself 
and his or her work, but he or she is not the owner of land and 
resources that are common property. According to Grunebaum, 
individual autonomy requires the private self-ownership and labour 
ownership and the joint ownership of the land and its resources. 
This kind of ownership is supposed to lead to a situation in which 
everyone will be the proprietors of land and its resources. Any other 
situation is, in his opinion, unjust because it generates inequality, 
which infringes the principle of individual autonomy29.
The division of property rights imposes different restrictions 
on certain rights. The essence of those restrictions boils down to 
the statement that while the autonomy of the individual requires 
guaranteeing a person some minimum form of ownership, control 
over an object (Christman), and the possibly of income (Grunebaum), 
then in the case of income (Christman) or resources and land 
(Grunebaum) individuals lose the ability to independently decide 
about their allocation.
Priority of distributive justice over ownership
The conviction that distributive justice has priority over property 
rights lies at the root of the various forms of property distribution. 
This is what supporters of liberal property conceptions assume. In 
other words, they say that the structure and forms of ownership 
must be adapted to the principles of distributional justice. “What 
one owns is what one owns justly”30, Christman writes. He also 
argues that property rights are a function of the total distribution 
28 Ibid, p. 178. Grunebaum believes that institutions such as inheritance, gift or exchange 
cannot constitute ownership criteria for the divestiture of property.
29 Ibidem, p. 153 and 175.
30 J. Christman, The Myth..., p. 10.
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of goods in society, which means that ownership should be shaped 
on the basis of distributive principles that govern the economy31. 
Christman makes no secret of the fact that his goal is a targeted, 
just distribution of resources, which is aimed to lead to a certain 
ownership structure32. The guarantor of this distribution is the state. 
That is why Christman does not think that state interference in the 
economy (resp. the free market) is something wrong. Christman, 
accepting that the state determines the pattern of distribution, 
accordingly recognizes that it defi nes both the rules governing the 
economy and the structure of ownership33.
Stephen R. Munzer holds a similar opinion. In the book titled 
A Theory of Property, he claims that consent to property rights over 
external things of the world – that is, control over them and making 
profi t from them – must be preceded by an analysis considering 
the impact that these rights have on their holders, especially 
on their personality, individuality, moral character, and future 
generations34. According to Munzer, this analysis can lead to the 
establishment of a certain ownership structure. Property rights are, 
therefore, secondary to the rules that organize society. So, as in the 
case of Munzer, we are dealing here with a certain pattern, which 
is based on the principles of utility and effi ciency (UE) and justice 
and equality (JE). The principle of effi ciency-usability (EU) says that 
property should be allocated in such a way as to maximize usability 
and effi ciency of the use, possession and transfer of goods35. This 
principle implies the belief that a certain amount of public property 
is justifi ed under the assumption that people prefer security, access 
to education, protection against fi re, crime, etc. It also warrants 
some – moderately equal – distribution of private property36.
31 Ibidem, p. 126.
32 In this case, we would speaking of the patterned principle according to Robert Nozick. 
See. R. Nozick, Anarchia, państwo, utopia (Anarchy, State, Utopia), trans. P. Maciejko, 
M. Szczubiałka, Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia 1999, subsection Jak wolność łamie schematy 
(How liberty upsets patterns), pp. 194–198.
33 J. Christman, The Myth..., p. 126.
34 S.R. Munzer, A Theory..., p. 58.
35 Ibidem, p. 4.
36 Ibidem, pp. 206, 212–214.
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On the other hand, the principle of justice-equality (JE) 
presupposes that “the unequal property holdings are justifi able if 
(1) everyone has a minimum amount of property (the Floor Thesis) 
and (2) the inequalities do not undermine a fully human life in 
society (the Gap Thesis)”37.
The Floor Thesis says that basic human needs (such as food, 
clothing, shelter or medical care) and basic capabilities (such as 
reading, writing, counting, working or being able to appear in public 
places without shame) should be ensured38.
Broadly speaking, the Gap Thesis aims to limit inequalities that 
prevent the individual from attaining a fully human life, which 
consists of a sense of dignity and self-esteem39. Munzer reasons 
that even if the conditions arising from the underlying thesis are 
met, wealth inequalities in society can be so wide that they will 
prevent some individuals from developing and thereby awarding 
them equal moral value. According to Munzer’s concept, ownership 
and property rights intend to serve the achievement of a certain 
social ideal, whose goals are effi ciency, justice and equality.
Both Christman and Munzer assume that ownership rights 
cannot be considered independently of a broader view of society, 
and, above all, of the notion of fair distribution based on the 
principles of egalitarianism. It is only formulating the principles of 
justice that can allow choosing the right forms of ownership.
Labour and merit as titles to ownership
Advocates of liberal property concepts reject Locke’s theory that 
labour constitutes a title to ownership. According to John Locke, 
work is the property of the labourer, it is the act by which external 
37 Ibidem, pp. 5 and 229. One could look here for an analogy to the two principles of justice 
formulated by John Rawls, who argued that certain goods are necessary to be free and who 
listed personal property as one of them. Munzer discusses these issues. Ibidem, pp. 233–241.
38 Ibidem, p. 241.
39 Ibidem, p. 247.
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things become the property of a person; for the labour belongs to 
him or her40: “The «labour» of his body and the «work» of his hands, 
we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of 
the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed 
his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property”41. Labour, like the duty to keep 
humanity alive, is also a divine command:
 
God, when He gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man 
also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and 
his reason commanded him to subdue the earth – i.e., improve it for the 
benefi t of life and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his 
labour42. 
Removing something out of the state of nature, where everything 
is common “b e g i n s  the property, without which the common is of 
no use”43. The beginning of private property is, therefore, associated 
with the original appropriation. Appropriation does not require 
everyone’s consent, because everyone is entitled to do so and the 
thing extracted from the state of nature “becomes my property 
without the assignation or consent of anybody”44.
Locke claims that property entitlement must be charged on both 
the effort or toil put into creating or transforming an object, and 
the labour that improved an object. He adopts the labour concept 
of value and writes that effects of work account for nine tenth of 
the value of each product45. He needs this theory to justify private 
40 “For this «labour» being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can 
have a right to what that is once joined to”. J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, §27, York 




43 Ibidem, §28. 
44 Ibidem. 
45 Ibidem, §40. In the theory of value based on work, it is assumed that the value of the item 
produced is determined by the amount of work invested into its production. Adam Smith 
and Karl Marx, among others, supported this theory. Murray Newton Rothbard ascribes 
Locke not so much to the labor theory of value as the labor theory of the origin of property. 
See. M.N. Rothbard, Economic Thought before Adam Smith, vol. 1, Auburn: Ludvig von Mises 
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property. For if a person’s work causes a change in the world for 
the better, then he or she has the right to something that he or 
she has removed from the state of nature. Locke assumes here 
that work and the toil associated with it are a necessary – though 
insuffi cient – condition for acquisition. If the transformation of the 
world were done in the opposite ratio (the contribution of man was 
one tenth, and the remaining “work” was done by nature), then it 
would be more diffi cult for him to justify private acquisition. Locke 
gradually increases these proportions in favour of work (99 : 100 and 
999 : 1000)46 to declare: “For whatever bread is more worth than 
acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk than leaves, skins or moss, 
that is w h o l l y  owing to labour and industry”47 [emphasis DJ]. 
The work expended in a product grants the title to the property, 
because it entails improving something. “God and his reason 
commanded him to subdue the earth – i.e., improve it for the benefi t 
of life and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his 
labour”48. The improvement of things through labour stems from 
God’s command and, at the same time, the human right to preserve 
oneself and others. Furthermore, it is the basis of ownership, which 
means that destructive work does not give such entitlement49. 
God, as Locke states, “gave it to the use of the industrious and 
rational (and labour was to be his t i t l e  to it); not to the fancy 
or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious”50. Therefore, 
labour is not only the effort put into a thing (for example, on a whim, 
Institute, 2006, pp. 57 and 317). However, it seems that under Locke’s defi nition, work is 
a source of both property and value.
46 J. Locke, Two Treatises…, §41, § 43.
47 Ibidem, §42. It seems that the examples are not quite successfully chosen by Locke. In 
the case of wine and bread, much of the work is “done by nature”. Locke admits that there 
is a difference between making bread (the number of people and activities involved) and 
collecting acorns from the ground. In the latter case, the labour theory of value seems to 
be less fi tting. Therefore, as Waldron notes, it is paradoxically more problematic to acquire 
acorns than a piece of land that is being cultivated. See. J. Waldron, The Right to Private..., 
p. 193.
48 J. Locke, Two Treatises…, §32. 
49 If I throw garbage into a pond that is not owned by anyone, I do not make this pond my 
property.
50 J. Locke, Two Treatises…, §34.
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for entertainment or out of a destructive impulse), but an activity 
through which the thing is improved. The command to improve 
things results directly from the command for self-preservation. If 
people did not perfect things, did not transform them, they would 
not be able to survive and thus would not be able to fulfi l the 
divine mandate. It seems, therefore, that only labour that improves 
deserves to be called rational, i.e., such that pleases God.
Christman argues that the work involved in the production or 
processing of something does not give the right to bequest and 
income from that product: the only thing that it justifi es is the 
right to own and use that thing51. “All that Locke intends, even in 
a version of the argument that stresses the added value of labour, 
is to establish rights to exclusive use, possession, and management 
[of property – added by DJ] in a world where the enjoyment of such 
rights is necessary for the «advantage of life and convenience» and 
where others are not made worse off by such appropriation”52. 
Because, according to Christman, the added value of labour does 
not guarantee the exclusive right to transmissibility and income, 
the individual only has a contingent right to the produced goods53. 
In addition, according to Christman, creation of resources is not 
only the result of an individual’s work, but depends on interaction 
with others, the existence of a market and stable social relations54. 
Therefore, the individual cannot claim rights to transfer and 
proceeds from a given item, because by interacting with another 
person, he or she ceases to be the sole holder of the rights 
to that item.
In Christman’s opinion, the title to the ownership of a given object 
does not result from merit, which is to be the outcome of the effort 
expended in the process of labour. In his opinion, individuals do not 
51 J. Christman, The Myth..., pp. 54 and 66.
52 Ibidem, p. 52.
53 Christman claims that if we agree to the imposition of distributive restrictions on acts 
of original appropriation, we can also impose restrictions on all subsequent actions of 
individuals, especially those that lead to receiving income from the given appropriation. 
Ibidem, p. 66.
54 Ibidem, p. 57. 
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deserve income from an imperfect market determined by competitive 
forces. Therefore, in Christman’s view, the concept of desert does 
not vindicate the idea of  liberal ownership, which includes the right 
to transfer and income55. Christman claims that the character traits 
and talent that an entrepreneur must exhibit – being undeserved 
– do not entitle him to profi ts. He maintains that an entrepreneur 
has no right to profi t, because this profi t also comprises things that 
are not in his or her discretion (these include limited resources, 
information and technology, together with patents and copyrights)56. 
Christman argues that since entrepreneurs do not deserve profi ts, 
they also do not deserve the right to income.
Similar doubts are raised by Lawrence C. Becker, who asks about 
the reason behind the belief that the work invested into something 
grants ownership rights over this thing57. He draws attention to the 
fact that in the case of parents’ relationships with their children, 
the right to property over the fruits of their own work seems 
controversial: either parents are not the owners of their children, or 
children are not (until adulthood) the owners of themselves58.
Becker, recognizing Locke’s right to own one’s body and the right 
to own one’s work which was derived therefrom, questions the right 
to possess the products of that work as separate from one’s body 
and labour59. He claims that the question asked by Robert Nozick 
is valid, namely – why, when performing work, do we assume 
that we become the owners of its products, and not that we lose 
something?60. Becker asserts that the work involved in something, 
55 Ibidem, pp. 84 and 87.
56 Ibidem, p. 91. Christman also analyses the argument that an entrepreneur deserves 
profi t, because he or she took the risk associated with setting up a company, production, 
etc. However, he rejects it, arguing that risk alone cannot be the basis for merit. If you take 
risk for the wrong cause, you cannot say you deserve a profi t. It is also not the case that the 
degree of risk is proportional to the profi t. Sometimes we risk a lot, and we receive a small 
profi t, and vice versa. Ibidem, p. 91.
57 L.C. Becker, Property Rights..., p. 40.
58 Ibidem, p. 37.
59 Ibidem, p. 40.
60 Ibidem. Nozick’s thought, to which Becker refers, reads as follows: “If I own a can of 
tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check 
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although it renders the thing “mine”, does not give me ownership 
of it. In this case, argues Becker, demanding the right to a given 
product will be the same as demanding admiration for the labour, 
gratitude from other members of the group, or an entry in the world 
book of achievements61. Becker believes that the obligation to prove 
that the work inputs in the production or processing of goods lead 
to ownership rests with those who argue for this point, not those 
who criticize it62.
When disputing the concept of justifying property rights by 
referring to claims to ownership of labour, Becker cites the words 
of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: “The rich, exclaims Jean Jacques, have 
the arrogance to say, «I built this wall; I earned this land by my 
labour». Who set you the task? We may reply, and by what right do 
you demand payment from us for labour which we did not impose 
on you? All sophistry falls to the ground in the presence of this 
argument”63. Becker summarizes Proudhon’s thought as follows: 
since we did not force you to work, we do not have to pay you by 
granting you ownership of the thing into which you invested your 
labour64. Becker assumes that any acquisition causes a competitive 
advantage and as such is unfair. He asks the rhetorical question: 
why should intelligent people inherit the earth? Did they deserve 
the resources that enable them to take over?65. Becker contends 
that the acquisition of goods through the work invested them, while 
this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly 
dissipated my tomato juice?”. R. Nozick, Anarchy..., p. 209. Nozick’s witty example, however, 
misses the point. For neither Locke nor any of his followers would call the situation described 
by Nozick a legitimate acquisition of anything. According to Locke, the title of ownership is 
connected with the type of labour that improves a thing, not wastes it. Let us also note that if 
Nozick’s question and Becker’s doubts were justifi ed, we would be facing an absurd situation 
in which the question of property rights would become unfounded. If the performed work 
were a wasted effort that does not, according to Locke’s reasoning, give entitlement rights 
to things, then all such “products” would enter the market as nobody’s. No trade would be 
possible then, because no one would own anything.
61 L.C. Becker, Property Rights..., p. 40.
62 Ibidem, p. 40
63 J.P. Proudhon, Co to jest własność? (What is property?), in: J. Dziżyński, Proudhon, 
Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1975, p. 181. See also L.C. Becker, Property Rights..., p. 41.
64 L.C. Becker, Property Rights..., p. 44. 
65 Ibidem.
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imposing on others the obligation to refrain from interference in 
these fruits of labour, deprives others of their freedoms66. He also 
argues that the idea  of the labouring process being suffi cient to 
legitimise a tile to ownership cannot be a source concept, that is to 
say, one that no longer requires proof. According to Becker, work 
can be a reason i.e. entitlement to reward, but not to ownership67. 
Ownership can only be the reward for work in some cases.
The same applies to the idea of  merit or desert, which, for 
Becker, cannot qualify as grounds for property rights68. Becker 
argues that labour inputs should not always be remunerated by 
granting the labourer the title of ownership; sometimes this reward 
can be a substitute in the form of money, and sometimes it can be 
appreciation or gratitude69.
Stephen R. Munzer also rejects the possibility of legitimising 
ownership through work as merit. He formulates the principle of 
desert by labour (DL), which states that there is a justifi cation for 
rights of private property based on the work invested by a person in 
a given thing. At the core of this principle is the belief that persons are 
agents who performs actions in the world and, consequently, they 
are entitled to receiving benefi ts for the results of these actions70. 
He proposes a revised DL theory suggesting that the traditional 
Lockean concept rests on unrealistic premises which favour private 
property71.
Revised by Munzer, the concept assumes that natural or 
voluntary duties can modify property rights arising from work 
contributions72. This theory imposes several restrictions on the DL 
principle, including: (1) the limitation resulting from the obligation 
(a) to those who, due to physical or mental impairment, are unable 
to work (employees must give up part of their profi ts to these people), 
66 Ibidem. 
67 Ibidem, p. 47.
68 Ibidem, p. 51.
69 Ibidem, p. 53.
70 S.R. Munzer, A Theory..., p. 254. 
71 Ibidem, p. 255.
72 Ibidem, p. 267.
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(b) related to the use of goods or the failure to use them (holders 
have the duty to use their goods in such a way as to avoid any 
evident waste)73; (2) the limitation resulting from a post-acquisition 
situation, which is not directly caused by the acquisition (if, for 
example, someone acquires a fi eld where they grow wheat, however 
due to a drought next year later, no one is able to claim possession 
of the wheat based on their work, as Munzer argues, the proprietary 
rights of the person who acquired the wheat are now diminished)74; 
(3) a limitation due to a general scarcity of resources (in this case, the 
producers of the goods do not receive property rights, but a salary).
Comparing his own, revised labour theory with Locke’s principles, 
Munzer states that the initial (Locke’s) theory of property, which 
is purely moral, lacks the instruments by which it could be put 
into practice. However, the revised theory is enforceable thanks to 
institutional tools75.
Munzer argues that the traditional labour-merit theory is only 
an anchor for prima facie property rights, not for property rights in 
general. He believes that the right to property as a result of merit 
arising from work is relative and not absolute under the initial 
theory. In his opinion, fi rstly, by granting ownership to person 
A of thing X, which A has created or acquired, this theory does not 
prove that individuals B, C etc. have no claim-right to that thing, for 
example based on their high moral character. Secondly, the theory 
does not justify the fact that an individual deserves to possess 
work-facilitating qualities (diligence, perseverance, intelligence, 
entrepreneurship) that enable his or her labour and, consequently, 
acquisition. If people are not deserving of these qualities, then, 
Munzer claims, they are not deserving of the things they possess76. 
James O. Grunebaum also criticizes Locke’s concept of labour as 
an act which gives title to ownership. In his opinion, the principle of 
autonomous ownership is incompatible with Locke’s justifi cation of 
73 Ibidem, p. 268.
74 Ibidem, p. 276.
75 Ibidem, p. 286.
76 Ibidem, pp. 260–262.
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property rights. At the root of Locke’s concept are two unwarranted 
assumptions: (1) unappropriated things are not anyone’s property; 
(2) there is an abundance of goods. The cited author interrogates 
both of them. He argues that if we admit that not belonging to anyone 
means not belonging to anyone according to some unspecifi ed form 
of ownership, the question of the original acquisition which entitles 
to private ownership remains open. However, if we are convinced 
that the earth belongs to all, then, in Grunebaum’s opinion, 
individual private acquisition requires the consent of all, otherwise 
the acquisition will be groundless77. This means that if someone 
believes that the original form of ownership is joint ownership, they 
may not agree to granting property rights to someone who acquired 
the thing before they did. Therefore, Locke’s argument of “invested 
labour” is unfounded, in Grunebaum’s opinion. The statement “this 
is mine because I possessed it fi rst” is not a convincing argument 
in the debate on the autonomy of individuals78. Grunebaum rejects 
the second assumption about the abundance of goods as completely 
unrealistic.
Jeremy Waldron also disputes the possibility of deriving the right 
to property from the performed work. In his opinion, the principle 
of acquisition as a result of labour – according to which this labour 
grants the title to ownership – is not compatible with our sense of 
morality79, it is also not self-evident and would not be stipulated 
as part of a contract. Waldron writes that this is a principle “such 
that a whole people could not possibly agree to”80 He is certain that 
individuals in a quasi-original situation would not adopt the principle 
that one should refrain from interfering in someone’s property even in 
life-threatening situations81. In addition, a way of acquiring property 
77 Ibidem, p. 174.
78 Ibidem, pp. 153, 155.
79 “[...] could be unfamiliar, and may be unwelcome, addition to a morality just like our 
own”. J. Waldron, The Right to Private…, p. 270.
80 Ibidem, p. 278.
81 Waldron notes, however, that no legal system contains a proviso stating that in situations 
where life is threatened, the theft of someone’s property is justifi ed and that a necessity of life 
is an excuse for violating someone’s property. Ibidem, p. 283.
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by expended effort would favour more able and entrepreneurial 
individuals, while others would be at a disadvantage82. Therefore, 
according to Waldron, instead of Locke’s principle, individuals could 
choose a Hobbesian state of nature in which, in order to survive, one 
could deprive others of property without committing injustice.
All of these philosophers question Locke’s assertion that labour 
is a property entitlement, which, in consequence, means excluding 
others from the possibility of using the product of work. They 
maintain that labour is not a suffi cient reason for limiting the 
possibilities of others, and thus their freedom.
Division into production and distribution
Proponents of the liberal concepts of ownership take for granted 
the division into production and distribution, recognizing that they 
are two separate processes83.
The distinction between the right to preside over one’s possessions 
and the right to gain income from them, which John Christman 
makes, presupposes a division into production and distribution. 
For if, as Christman assumes, different distribution rules apply to 
the rights to control an item and different – the rights to income, 
then there must be distribution which is separate from production. 
Therefore, like most modern political philosophers, the author 
82 Ibidem, p. 275. See also pp. 274–275. Even if all individuals were equally equipped, those 
who acquired resources fi rst would be privileged. Ibidem, p. 275.
83 Friedrich von Hayek blamed John Stuart Mill for introducing this harmful distinction – 
which still appears in the economic discourse – which consequently leads to the notion of 
distributive or social justice. Mill wrote: “This is not so with the distribution of wealth. That 
is a matter of human institutions solely. The things once there, mankind, individually or 
collectively, can do with them as they like. They may place them at the disposal of whomever 
they please on whatever terms”. J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, New York: Augustus 
M. Kelly, 1987, p. 209. In Autobiography, Mill, however, criticizes those economists who 
confuse the laws of producing goods with the laws of their division, considering both to 
be what cannot be overcome or changed with human effort. See: J.S. Mill, Autobiography, 
after: M. Dobb, Teorie wartości i podziału od Adama Smitha. Ideologia a teoria ekonomii 
(Theories of value and distribution since Adam Smith. Ideology and economic theory), trans. 
W. Rączkowska, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1976, p. 135.
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theorizes that fi rst comes the labour and production performed by 
someone, and then the distribution of what has been produced. He 
consequently claims that the individual has the right to his or her 
labour, but not to its products, that is, the benefi ts derived from the 
produced goods. The produced items are subject to distribution, 
which is independent of individual will.
The same view of production and distribution is expressed by 
Stephen R. Munzer, who claims that every theory of property should 
grapple with both the problem of production and the problem of 
distribution. He accuses classical liberal theorists – from Adam 
Smith to Friedrich von Hayek – that by leaving production and 
distribution to market forces, they ”tend to slight both problems”84. 
Munzer does not accept, however, abandoning distribution to the 
market, as he believes that it should be the responsibility of the 
state. Therefore, he is in favour of levying taxes on both income 
and gratuitous transfers. He suggests that this taxation should be 
neither too low (so that it can cover some costs), nor too heavy (so 
as not to discourage labour). According to Munzer, the income thus 
obtained should be used to assuage the effects of hunger and to 
provide shelter, clothing or health care. In turn, production should 
be reorganized in such a way as to promote meaningful work (an 
element of this reorganization may include the improvement of 
working conditions or the enlistment of employees’ in production 
goals). The consequence of such a reorganization would be a greater 
role of employees in the production process itself and their larger 
impact on the conditions in the workplace. Munzer emphasizes that 
such changes may admittedly reduce wealth, but they will increase 
the amount of meaningful work that can be valued more than 
wealth. He believes that the place of production in human life must 
be re-evaluated. As he writes, homo faber must be replaced by homo 
cogitans and homo ludens85.
84 S.R. Munzer, A Theory..., p. 184.
85 Ibidem, pp. 184–185.
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When separating the notions of production and distribution, 
Munzer distinguishes between production management and 
distribution management. Consequently, he must assume that 
since we are dealing with two types of management, we must also be 
dealing with two types of managers. While the scholar allows for the 
possibility of individualized production or individualized production 
management, he objects to fully individualized distribution. By 
making the distinction between production and distribution, he 
advocates the concept of ownership, in which the state, and not the 
individual, is the ultimate owner of property rights86.
The role of the state
The division into production and distribution, commonly adopted 
among liberals, subsequently leads to assigning the distributive 
function to the state (and not to the market). The state decides to 
what extent an entity can control its property and how to derive 
income from it.
According to John Christman, the state acts as a distributor and 
redistributor of property. It is the state, he suggests, that decides 
about the ownership structure, i.e. what people can do with their 
holdings, “whether they could sell them and, if so, at what price”87. 
“I reject the claim”, he writes, “that the state should play no role in 
structuring property rights for the sake of distributive goals”88.
Christman proposes, on the one hand, state protection of control 
rights and, on the other, state control over the income of individuals. 
He advocates redistributive taxation that interferes with the right 
86 Becker also agrees, like other liberals, that the division into the allocation of resources 
used for the production and the distribution of goods is something widely accepted by 
economists. L.C. Becker, Property Rights..., p. 70. The subject of distribution are primarily 
shrinking resources, which are the justifi cation for the restrictions imposed on property 
rights. These restrictions are inevitable due to problems related to the scarcity of resources.
87 J. Christman, The Myth..., p. 4.
88 Ibidem, p. 10–11.
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to revenue. While he does not prohibit individuals from freely 
exercising their talents, at the same time, he is convinced that the 
proceeds from the use of these talents must be redistributed by the 
state on an egalitarian basis.
Christman admits that his concept of “equality of product” – 
understood as collective ownership of income – resembles the 
concept of collective ownership of talent89. He acknowledges 
that the inequality of talent is the same as artifi cial monopolies 
in the economy and barriers to market access related to it. “My 
lack of access to your talents”, he writes, “functions the same way 
as do natural barriers that let proximity to resources determine 
distribution”90.
Since the free market does not guarantee predictable income 
that minimal autonomy requires, the state must do so91. The state 
should therefore provide (irrespective of market mechanisms, which 
Christman partly accepts) the necessary means to secure minimal 
autonomy for all citizens92. According to him, market socialism is the 
system that can ensure this autonomy while partially maintaining 
free market mechanisms.
A similar position is taken by Stephen R. Munzer, who claims 
that only the government – and not free market entities – is able to 
justly distribute income and wealth and that leaving distribution 
in the hands of the free market will not warrant the fulfi lment of 
values  such as control over property, privacy or individuality93. In 
his opinion, a system that can be called fair is only an arrangement 
in which distribution and allocation guarantee a minimum and/or 
suffi cient amount of goods.
Munzer proposes a system in which the ultimate administrator 
of property is the state, whose task is to observe the principles of 
utility and effi ciency as well as justice and equality. In practice, it 
89 Ibidem, p. 157.
90 Ibidem, p. 158.
91 “So the state, by its nature, regulates the relative well-being of its citizens”. Ibidem, p. 174.
92 Ibidem, p. 171.
93 S.R. Munzer, A Theory..., p. 110.
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comes down to strengthening workers’ rights, taxing donations and 
inheritances, and a number of regulations on private property94. 
The nature of Munzer’s concept comes to light when, in several 
places, he refers to the fi gure of the social planner, whose task, after 
analysing confl icting principles, is to make the best decision for the 
whole society95.
For such a decision to be effective, the state that is supposed 
to meet basic needs and secure the achievement of vital life goals 
should be the owner of the resources which make this possible. 
According to Munzer, state ownership of resources and means of 
production is to warrant a quick and effective response to emerging 
problems or threats96.
Lawrence Becker, assuming that there is a common good, 
maintains that those who contribute to its promotion deserve 
a reward, whereas those who reduce it by appropriating others’ 
capabilities, deserve punishment. The state decides whether an 
activity or venture is conducive to the increase of prosperity and, 
consequently, who deserves what prize in what form. The penalty – 
for example in the form of taxation – is also meted out by the state.
Jeremy Waldron presupposes the existence of the state as an 
institution which ensures fair distribution. Since, in his opinion, 
work does not entitle one to ownership, there must be an higher 
instance that will decide about the allocation of what was produced 
as a result of someone’s labour. This institution is the state which 
must act as a redistributor. However, Waldron claims, like Hayek, 
that it is not oppressive when already at the beginning the state sets 
limits to the expectations of individuals in the name of justice97.
Proponents of liberal property concepts argue that property cannot 
be submitted to the rules of the free market, as it does not secure 
a just distribution of goods, which gives individuals the opportunity 
94 Ibidem, pp. 7 and 216.
95 Ibidem, pp. 292, 295, 297, 300, 301, 311, 312.
96 Ibidem, p. 245.
97 J. Waldron, The Right to Private..., p. 425. 
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for growth. Therefore, a state whose task is to distribute resources 
fairly must step in. This means, fi rst and foremost, that individuals 
cease to be the sole owners of acquired goods and resources.
Conclusion
Liberal concepts of ownership – unlike in classic Locke’s 
liberalism – make the content of the property right or the ownership 
relationship contingent on the content of positive law. In other words, 
they do not view property rights as a natural law. All the described 
concepts of ownership are egalitarian. Their main assumption, 
although not always explicitly stated, is that all people should have 
equal opportunities for personal growth, and ownership is one of the 
elements that should enable this growth. Egalitarianism, however, 
rules out the absolute nature of ownership or absolute control over 
the products of labour98. Ownership cannot be exclusive, because it 
must serve everyone, while retaining the autonomy of the individual. 
Liberal property conceptions, therefore, aim to equally distribute 
property and to secure individual autonomy. (hence, in a sense, they 
are a response to Mill’s postulate of freedom of self-development 
and self-fulfi lment). Therefore, supporters of this concept propose 
different treatment of control rights and income, land or resources 
rights. Distinguishing these rights from each other allows to apply 
to them different concepts of distributive justice which underpins 
the decisions about the ownership structure and ultimately seeks 
to narrow inequalities in society. The concept of ownership is thus 
founded on the concept of justice, whose purpose is to eliminate 
social inequalities.
98 As Waldron writes, “It is probably a mistake therefore to insist on any defi nition of private 
property that implies a proprietor has absolute control over his resource”. J. Waldron, 
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Contemporary Liberal Concepts of Property 
The author presents the assumptions which form the bedrock of modern 
liberal property theories. It refers to the conceptions of John Christman, 
James O. Grunebaum, Lawrence Becker, Stephen R. Munzer and Jeremy 
Waldron. All these philosophers have devoted separate monographs to 
the problems of ownership and their works seem representative of the 
entire liberal current in contemporary political philosophy. This paper 
does not provide a detailed analysis of the authors’ views on property, 
but focuses on the elements that these theories share. These are: (1) the 
bundle theory of property rights; (2) the priority of distributive justice 
over ownership; (3) the belief that labour is not a property entitlement; 
(4) the assumption about the separation of production and distribution; 
(e) the belief in the redistributive role of the state.
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